	sequence	Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence Announcements 03.31			
	he Logic of Quantifiers I Truth & Consequence in Full FOL	<ul> <li>The Midterm has been returned</li> <li>If you haven't gotten yours back, see me after class</li> </ul>			
	William Starr				
	03.31.09				
Introduction FO Validity FO Cons Outline	sequence	Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence Overview The Big Picture			
	sequence	Overview			
	sequence	Overview The Big Picture ● Now that we've added ∀ and ∃, we have introduced			
Outline	sequence	<ul> <li>Overview The Big Picture</li> <li>Now that we've added ∀ and ∃, we have introduced every connective of FOL:</li> </ul>			

#### Overview Today

- So today we'll be interested in two questions:
  - Which sentences containing quantifiers are logical truths?
  - Which arguments containing quantifiers are valid?
- We'll start by reviewing our past discussion of logical truths and logical consequence

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### The Logical Concepts Logical Truth & Logical Consequence

### Logical Truth

A is a logical truth iff it is **impossible** for A to be false given the meaning of the logical vocabulary it contains

### Logical Consequence

C is a logical consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  iff it is impossible for  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  to be true while C is false

- Both of these concepts are at the very heart of logic
  - But, they are annoyingly vague and imprecise
  - What exactly is meant by *impossible*?
- In the first half of the class we explored one method for making logical possibility precise: truth tables

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# Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence

Truth Tables

- These definitions are a step towards better understanding logical truth and consequence:
  - Every tautology is an (intuitive) logical truth
  - Every tautological consequence is an (intuitive) logical consequence
- But the step is **not** complete:
  - Some logical truths are not tautologies
  - Some logical consequences are not tautological consequences
- The difficulty was that the notion of logical possibility used in truth tables was not discerning enough

# Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence Truth Tables Their Spoils

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• Truth tables allowed us to define the following concepts:

# Tautology

A is a tautology iff every row the truth table assigns  ${\rm T}$  to  ${\rm A}$ 

# Tautological Consequence

C is a tautological consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  iff every row of their joint truth table which assigns T to  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  also assigns T to C

- Recall the procedure for building a truth-table:
- Build ref. col's
- 2 Fill ref. col's
- Fill col's under connectives

Truth Table				
a = a	b = b	$a=a\wedgeb=b$		
Т	Т	Т		
Т	F	F		
F	Т	F		
F	F	F		
		1		

- This table shows that  $a=a\wedge b=b$  is not a tautology: there are some F's in the main column
- But it is, intuitively, a logical truth

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#### Discussion Truth Tables & Logical Possibility

- The same deficiency causes there to be logical consequences which are not tautological consequences
  - $\bullet\,$  Example: a=c is a logical but not a tautological consequence of  $a=b\wedge b=c$
- Why not just leave rows out if they aren't genuine logical possibilities?
- This robs truth tables of their purpose:
  - They were supposed to be a precise way of analyzing logical possibility
  - If we can just appeal to our intuitions about logical possibility in building the columns, our analysis gets us nowhere
- So, we want to develop a better analysis of logical possibility



# Truth Tables Not Discerning Enough

Build ref. col's
 Fill ref. col's
 Fill col's under connectives

Truth Table				
a = a	b = b	$a=a\wedgeb=b$		
Т	Т	Т		
Т	F	F		
F	Т	F		
F	F	F		

- The problem is caused by the fact that in building truth tables, possibilities are included which are not genuine logical possibilities
  - $\bullet\,$  It is not logically possible for a=a or b=b to be F!

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Tying In Quantification We Need That Better Analysis Even More

- In case you weren't already convinced that truth tables left something to be desired, think about how few of the quantificational logical truths are tautologies
  - $\bullet \ \forall x \left(\mathsf{Cube}(x) \to \mathsf{Cube}(x)\right) \ (\mathrm{Not} \ \mathrm{a} \ \mathrm{Tautology})$
  - $\forall x (Cube(x) \lor \neg Cube(x))$  (Not a Tautology)
  - $\exists x (x = x)$  (Not a Tautology)
- Although some logical truths with quantifiers are tautologies:
  - $\forall x \, \mathsf{Cube}(x) \lor \neg \forall x \, \mathsf{Cube}(x) \ (\mathrm{Tautology})$
  - $\neg(\exists x \operatorname{Cube}(x) \land \neg \exists x \operatorname{Cube}(x))$  (Tautology)

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## FO Validity A Small Step

#### Logical Truth

A is a logical truth iff it is **impossible** for A to be false given the meaning of the logical vocabulary it contains

• We are only interested in  $\forall, \exists, \leftrightarrow, \rightarrow, \lor, \land, \neg$  and =, so we are interested in a more limited concept

#### First-Order Validity (FO Validity)

A sentence A is a first-order validity just in case it is impossible for A to be false, given the meanings of  $\forall, \exists, \leftrightarrow, \rightarrow, \lor, \land, \neg$  and =

• Better named First-Order Logical Truth

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An Example Use a Non-Sense Predicate

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- (1)  $\forall x (Cube(x) \rightarrow Cube(x))$ 
  - It sounds true even with a non-sense predicate:
    - (2)  $\forall x (Blornk(x) \rightarrow Blornk(x))$
    - (3) All blornks are blornks
  - There's no interpretation of 'Blornk' according to which (2) isn't true
  - So (1) remains true no matter how we interpret its non-logical symbols
  - So (1) must be a FO validity

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# An Idea

- We need to be more clear about the notion of logical possibility used to define FO validity
- Here's the insight we'll build on
- The FO validities are sentences which are true purely in virtue of the meaning of ∀, ∃, ↔, →, ∨, ∧, ¬ and =
- If their truth derives solely from the logical symbols, then you should be able vary the meaning of any of its predicates (other than =) and names and still get a true sentence
- Any variation of the meaning of the non-logical symbols is a logical possibility

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Another Example Use a Non-Sense Predicate

- (4)  $\forall x \operatorname{Rich}(x) \rightarrow \operatorname{Rich}(\operatorname{mc.hammer})$ 
  - This sounds true even with non-sense predicates and names:
    - (5)  $\forall x \operatorname{Rorg}(x) \rightarrow \operatorname{Rorg}(\operatorname{dude})$
    - (6) If everything is a rorg, then dude is a rorg
  - So (4) must be a FO validity

#### Yet Another Example Use a Non-Sense Predicate

(7)  $\neg \exists x LeftOf(x, x)$ 

• Replace meaningful predicate with meaningless one:

(8)  $\neg \exists x \operatorname{Glirs}(x, x)$ 

- Is this obviously true?
- No, it would depend on whether or not something can glir itself
- This is a not a fact about the meaning of logical symbols, so this is not a FO validity

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#### Counterexamples How to Formulate Them

(7)  $\neg \exists x LeftOf(x, x)$ 

- Let's provide a counterexample to this
- ③ Replace predicates & names w/non-sense ones:
   (8) ¬∃x Glirs(x,x)
- Try to reinterpret the non-sense and find a circumstance under which the reinterpreted formula is false:
  - Let Glirs mean *loves*
  - As a matter of fact Loves(tom.cruise, tom.cruise)
  - $\bullet~{\rm In~this~case}~\neg\exists x\, Loves(x,x)~{\rm is~false}$
  - Therefore (7) is not a logical truth!

#### Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence

## Counterexamples What They Are

- (7)  $\neg \exists x LeftOf(x, x)$ 
  - We saw that, intuitively, (7) is not a logical truth
  - But we want to have a more precise way of showing this
  - Here's our new method:
    - Replace predicates and names with non-sense names when checking for FO validity
    - Then consider whether or not there is any reinterpretations of the formula that falsify it
    - If there are, specify such an interpretation
      - This specification is called a *counterexample*
    - If there is no such specification, then the formula is a logical truth

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# FO Validity

The Replacement Method for FO Validities

#### The Replacement Method (FO Validities)

The following method can be used to check whether or not  ${\sf S}$  is a FO Validity

- Systematically replace all of the predicates, other than =, and names with new, meaningless predicates and names
- Try to describe a circumstance, along with interpretations for the names and predicates, in which S is false.
  - If there is no such circumstance and interpretation, S is a FO validity
  - If there is such a circumstance and interpretation, it's called a *counterexample* and S is not a FO validity

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## FO Validty One More Example

- (9)  $\forall x (Larger(x, a) \rightarrow Smaller(a, x))$
- Q Replace predicates and names with non-sense:
   (9') ∀x (Lirrs(x, alf) → Stams(alf, x))
- <sup> $\bigcirc$ </sup> Try to assign a meaning to the non-sense and construct a circumstance in which (7') is false:
  - $\bullet\,$  Let Lirrs mean dates and Stams mean likes
  - Consider the following circumstance: Alf dates Bea, but Alf doesn't like her
  - So  $\neg(\mathsf{Lirrs}(\mathsf{bea},\mathsf{alf}) \to \mathsf{Stams}(\mathsf{alf},\mathsf{bea}))$
  - $\bullet \ \mathrm{Thus}, \, \forall x \, (\mathsf{Lirrs}(x,\mathsf{alf}) \to \mathsf{Stams}(\mathsf{alf},x)) \ \mathrm{is} \ \mathrm{false}$
- So (9) is not a logical truth

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The Replacement Method

- The replacement method is nice and all, but it doesn't seem very precise
- We just search for interpretations and circumstances and if we can't do it, it's a logical truth?
  - No. There is an objective fact of the matter about whether or not it can be done
- Although this search seems hazy and unstructured, it can be made much more precise
  - This would involve learning a branch of mathematics called *model theory*, which is beyond our aspirations in this class
  - Chapter 18 of *LPL* uses model theory to make the replacement method more precise

# FO Validity FO Consequent

- Fitch
  - Fitch also provides a tool for studying FO Validities (FO Logical Truths)

# FO Con

- FO Con is like Ana Con, except it looks only at the meanings of the logical symbols
- You can test if a sentence is a FO Validity by seeing if it follows from no premises using **FO Con**
- Let's look at a few examples of this in Fitch (Exercises 10.24 & 10.27)

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Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence The Replacement Method

Discussion

- The replacement method provides an analysis of logical possibility
- This analysis can also be applied to making the idea of logical consequence more precise
- This was another one of Alfred Tarski's innovations
- So, let's learn how to use the replacement method to test for logical consequence

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### Introducing FO Consequence

#### Logical Consequence

C is a logical consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  iff it is impossible for  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  to be true while C is false

- Impossible means logically impossible
- A logical possibility can be analyzed as pair consisting of a circumstance (state of the world) and a reinterpretation of the nonlogical symbols

#### FO Consequence

C is a FO Consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  iff in every circumstance and under every reinterpretation of the non-logical symbols, if  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  come out true, C does too

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# FO Consequence

#### Argument 2

Cube(a) Dodec(b)  $\neg$ (a = b)

#### Argument 2'



 So, ¬(a = b) is not a FO Consequence of the premises

- Let's see if we can find a circumstance and reinterpretation of Argument 1 that makes the premises true and the conclusion false
- Let Rah mean *is a reporter*, Bru mean *is a super-hero*, n mean *Clark Kent* and m mean *Superman*
- Now consider the fictional world of the superman comics:
  - Rah(n) is true
  - Bru(m) is true
  - But  $\neg(n = m)$  is false

## Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence

# FO Consequence

# Argument 1

 $\forall x \, (\mathsf{Small}(x) \to \mathsf{Cube}(x))$ 

Small(a) Cube(a)

Argument 1'

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall x \left( \mathsf{Nar}(x) \rightarrow \mathsf{Wiv}(x) \right) \\ \hline \\ \mathsf{Nar}(n) \\ \hline \\ \overline{\mathsf{Wiv}}(n) \end{array}$ 

- Let's see if we can find a circumstance and reinterpretation of Argument 1 that makes the premises true and the conclusion false
- All nars are wivs, **b** is a nar, so **n** is a wiv
- This still sounds valid, whatever nars, wivs and *n* are
- So, Cube(a) is a FO Consequence of the premises

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#### Introduction FO Validity FO Consequence

FO Consequence The Replacement Method

### The Replacement Method (FO Consequence)

The following method can be used to check whether or not C is a FO Consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$ :

- Systematically replace all of the non-logical symbols with non-sense symbols
- O Try to describe a circumstance, along with interpretations of the predicates in which  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$  are true and  $\mathsf{C}$  false.
  - $\bullet$  If there is no such circumstance and interpretation, C is a FO Consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$
  - $\bullet$  If there one, it's called a  ${\it counterexample}$  and C is not a FO Consequence of  $\mathsf{P}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{P}_n$

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other 10.13.

# In Class Exercise

FO Equivalence One Last Thing

# First-Order Equivalence (FO Equivalence)

A and B are FO equivalent iff B is a FO consequence of A and A is a FO consequence of B  $\,$ 

- So, there's nothing more to FO equivalence than to FO consequence
- To show FO consequence you just use the replacement method to show that A and B are FO consequences of each other

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Break into two groups. One group should do 10.10, the

Let's use **FO** Con in Fitch to check our answers

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